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ABSTRAK
Apakah menggiatnya aktivisme politik masyarakat sipil berkorelasi positif terhadap 
pendalaman demokrasi di Indonesia? Artikel ini berusaha menjawab pertanyaan ter-
sebut dengan mengkaji peranan masyarakat sipil dalam Pemilu Presiden 2014, dengan 
fokus aktivisme gerakan relawan yang mempengaruhi proses maupun hasil pemilu. 
Meskipun beberapa studi terkait aktivisme masyarakat sipil dalam pemilihan presiden 
2014 menyarankan adanya hubungan antara peran gerakan relawan dengan proses 
demokrasi di Indonesia, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa asumsi (dan glorifikasi) terha-
dap gerakan relawan dan kaitannya dengan demokrasi perlu dipertimbangkan kembali. 
Artikel ini berpendapat bahwa meskipun aktivisme gerakan relawan berkontribusi po-
sitif terhadap proses pemilu yang lebih demokratis, namun pemeriksaan lebih lanjut 
terhadap aktivisme gerakan relawan justru mengonfirmasi adanya karakteristik yang 
problematis serta keterbatasan gerakan relawan yang dapat menyebabkan keterpu-
tusan kaitan antara masyarakat sipil dan konsolidasi demokrasi di Indonesia.
Kata kunci: masyarakat madani, volunterisme, kelompok relawan, pemilihan presiden, 
konsolidasi demokrasi
ABSTRACT
Is a flourishing civil society’s political activism positively correlated with the deepening 
of Indonesian democracy? This article addresses this question by examining the role 
of civil society in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia, focusing on the collective 
actions of volunteer groups (known as Gerakan Relawan) that shaped both the election 
process and its result. While some studies on civil society activism in the 2014 presiden-
tial election suggested the connection between the role of volunteer movement and the 
democratic process in Indonesia, this paper suggests that the overpraised assumptions 
regarding the connection between civil society’s role and democratic consolidation, 
in the case of volunteer movement, needs to be reconsidered. This paper argues that 
although the activism of the volunteer movement has positively contributed to the 
democratic process of the 2014 election, however, realistic assessment of the volunteer 
movement confirms its problematic nature and the limits of volunteer activism that 
may contribute to the disconnection of civil society and democratic consolidation in 
the country.
Keywords: civil society, volunteerism, volunteers group, presidential election, democ-
ratic consolidation
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the debates on Indonesia’s presidential election in 2014 
remarked the notion of civil society as an engine behind the growing 
spirit of volunteerism, individual activism, public monitoring, and col-
lective actions that shaped both the election process and its result. Due 
to the vibrancy and voluntary activism of civil society during the 2014 
presidential election, they were hailed as “celebrity of the election” and 
even “savior of Indonesia’s democracy”. Following this success, observers 
and pundits highlighted the notion of civil society’s resurgence, whose 
power is beyond political parties in organizing and mobilizing popu-
lar support in the elections. Civil society has become critical element 
that has succeeded in changing electoral politics in Indonesia. They 
have manifested as a real political force vis-à-vis political parties and 
money-driven campaigns. According to the literatures, many believe 
that without the support of civil society, Joko Widodo (or Jokowi) would 
not have been elected as Jakarta’s governor in 2012 and president-elect 
in 2014 (Hurriyah 2018). Thus, the emergence of the so-called Gerakan 
Relawan has marked a new feature of civil society’s political activism 
in Indonesia’s electoral politics. 
Most studies regarding the phenomenon of volunteerism in the 2014 
residential election have suggested a connection between the role of 
civil society (in the form of volunteers) and democratization in Indo-
nesia (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015; Hasanuddin 2014; Suaedy 2014; 
Ambyo 2014; Arianto 2014) on the basis of two reasons: first, these 
volunteers –who worked individually and in groups, across all classes in 
society, had various backgrounds – emerged as a progressive civil society 
(Mietzner 2013) characterized by autonomous and voluntary organiza-
tions motivated by pro-democratic goals (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015) 
with a high degree of political awareness (Samah and Susanti 2014). 
Second, the role of volunteers is considered as a breakthrough for politi-
cal change in Indonesia (Suaedy 2014) and is in line with civil society’s 
democracy-building functions that deepen democracy in the country 
(Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015; Hasanuddin 2014; Okamoto 2014) and 
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help change the political values of patrimonial and oligarchic nuance 
in Indonesian political tradition (Alam, et al. 2017).
While the idea of civil society as an agent for democratic consolida-
tion has long been theoretical belief within the academic communities 
(Putnam 1993, Gellner 1994, Fukuyama 1996, Diamond 1999, Porio 
2002, Boussard 2003), a careful examination of whether this assumption 
is flawed and immature is necessary. Notably, after reaching soaring 
and unprecedented popularity in the last two decades, the concept of 
civil society has become the object of considerable scrutiny, cynicism, 
and even disdain for years (Berman 1997). Compared with  the idea 
of civil society as the remedy for the various ills afflicting advances 
industrial democracies (Putnam 1993), a flurry of studies accuses them 
of fostering the very ills they are meant to help cure: authoritarianism, 
corruption, and lack of accountability, to name just a few (Encarnación 
2006). Thus, the purpose of this article is to confirm the overpraised 
assumption of civil society and the case of Indonesia’s 2014 presidential 
election may underline this idea. 
Contrary to the literatures, this article suggests that the overpraised 
assumptions regarding the political activism of the volunteers and its 
connection to the democratic deepening should be reconsidered. This 
article attempts to answer whether a flourishing civil society’s political 
activism correlated positively with the deepening of Indonesian democ-
racy. By examining the role of the volunteer movement, this article aims 
to contribute to the debate on the connection between the role of civil 
society and democratic consolidation. This paper argues that although 
the robust activism of the volunteers movement has contributed to the 
democratic process and improved the quality of the 2014 election, their 
role had little, if any, effect on democratic consolidation in Indone-
sia. This study shows that the problematic nature and agenda of the 
volunteer groups have not limited their ability to perform democracy-
building functions and contributed to the disconnection of civil society 
and democratic consolidation in the country. 
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CI V IL SOCIET Y R ECONSIDER ED
The idea of civil society as an agent of democratic consolidation has 
long been a theoretical belief within the academic communities. Civil 
society is often hailed as the engine for democratization: in bringing 
about democratization, propelling democratic transition as well as con-
solidating democracy. Many scholars agree in describing civil society 
as a social force within a society that contributes to the development of 
democracy and serves as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation. 
Civil society, as Diamond (1994, 3-17) suggested, can contribute to the 
strengthening of democracy through its democratic-building functions, 
in which civil society: (1) sets the limit on state power; (2) supplements 
the role of political parties; (3) develops democratic attributes; (4) cre-
ates channels for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of 
interest, and generates opportunities for participation and influence at 
all levels of governance; (5) mitigates the principal polarities of politi-
cal conflicts; (6) recruits and trains new political leaders; (7) monitors 
elections; (8) disseminates information and aids citizens; (9) supports 
economic reform; and (10) strengthens the democratic state. 
As this paper attempts to avoid the glorification of civil society, care-
fully observing how the political context determines the nature of civil 
society and its effect on democracy is critical. One of the often raised 
questions is to what extent is a robust and vibrant civil society are ben-
eficial to the development of democracy and,  even more notable, to 
a consolidated democracy? The nature of civil society is such that it 
is a complex and heterogeneous entity that may compound organiza-
tions with undemocratic goals and uncivil manners. Civil society can 
be good or evil or something else, and its various components may or 
may not behave in a civil manner; additionally, it may or may not es-
pouse democratic goals (Bermeo 2000; Hadiwinata 2005). Hence, the 
glorification of the idea of civil society as a type of a panacea for the 
developing world, would result in consequences such as flawed argu-
ment that would require reconsideration.
The most influential text criticizing the idea of the virtuous power 
of civil society is Omar Encarnación’s The Myth of Civil Society, a study 
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of civil society in the consolidation of Spain and Brazil’s democracy. 
According to Encarnación, in contrast to the idea of a vibrant civil so-
ciety as prerequisite for democratization, a flourishing civil society can 
actually be a hindrance to democratization, particularly if surrounded 
by weak and inefficient political institutions. Encarnación (2003, 5) 
concludes that many of the new democracies during the third wave lack 
most of the conditions usually attached to a vibrant and robust civil so-
ciety. Similar to Encarnación’s emphasis on the political context of civil 
society, Caroline Boussard’s Civil Society’s Role in the Post-Transition 
Honduras is also useful. According to Boussard (2003), to understand 
civil society’s complex relationship to democracy, three features must be 
addressed: the political context, the external influence and the internal 
structure of civil society organizations (CSOs). 
In terms of political context, the role of civil society is strongly de-
pendent on the state, particularly the strategies of the governing elite. 
Without sufficient attention to the surrounding political structures, civil 
society’s democracy-building potential cannot be understood. In terms 
of external influence, the emergence of the so-called non-governmental 
organization (NGO) development has been emphasizing the impact 
of development assistance on civil society’s role in development and 
democratization. Finally, the internal structure of civil society orga-
nizations is also crucial to understand how civil society may contrib-
ute to democratization. As Boussard (2003, 6) asserted, a civil society 
compounds of organizations with undemocratic goals and methods, 
and with internal authoritarian structures, is not likely to contribute to 
democratic development by functioning as “schools for democracy”, as 
suggested by Alexis de Tocqueville, however, it may still have a democ-
racy-building function by being a countervailing power to the state .
CI V IL SOCIET Y ’S ACTI V ISM IN THE 
2014 PR ESIDENTI A L ELECTION
For much of the country, the 2014 presidential election has become 
a test for the longevity of Indonesian democracy, due to the formidable 
contestation between two candidates depicted as the symbol of a demo-
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cratic leader versus the authoritarian elite. Mietzner (2014, 112) asserts 
that the election was a threat to Indonesia’s democracy for two reasons: 
first, the election highlighted the strength of the country’s antidemo-
cratic forces -within the elite and the general electorate, and second, 
the election was a contest not only between two candidates, but also 
between diametrically opposed concepts of power and visions for Indo-
nesia’s future: namely, between grassroots volunteerism versus oligarchy; 
technocratic moderation versus populist demagoguery; and support for 
democratic elections versus the denunciation of them as “un-Indonesian 
and too costly”. To many prodemocracy activists, the election was the 
culmination of their sustained efforts in mobilizing various segments 
of Indonesian civil society in the post-Suharto transition. Given that 
the election occurred in a dramatic political environment, the rising 
of Prabowo’s popularity during the election eventually resulted in civil 
society entering the political arena and engaging with the political ac-
tivism during election in many ways. Civil society activists went from 
being neutral and focusing on election monitoring, to playing a more 
political and partisan role, working on or volunteering for campaigns 
to increase the electoral base for Jokowi. 
Although the political activism of civil society has been more robust 
ever since the 1998 Reformasi, the mobilization of civil society in this 
particular election was unprecedented, more diverse, more active, more 
political and partisan (Lay 2015). There are at least two differences in 
terms of civil society’s political activism in prior to 2014 presidential 
election. The first is the concern toward the electoral politics of civil 
society actors. Different from previous elections in which the political 
activism of civil society focused mainly in the arena of legislative elec-
tions (e.g., participating as legislature candidates from a political party 
or independent candidates), the 2014 presidential election witnessed a 
more partisan and politicized civil society. By these, it means that they 
involved in electoral activities not only as electoral base, but also actively 
participated as campaign machine for candidate. 
The second difference concerns civil society’s interaction with for-
mal politics and political parties. Prior to this election, civil society ac-
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tors developed connection with political parties and transformed their 
role from activists to politicians, to endorse many policy reforms and 
changes in the parliament (Ichwanuddin 2010; Perdana 2014). In this 
case, CSOs and activists used their personal relations and networks to 
open dialogue and communication with politicians in the House of 
Representative or DPR (Perdana 2015). Cooperation between the two 
parties then became a key factor that characterized civil society’s inter-
action with formal politics. By contrast, civil society’s attitude during 
2014 presidential election indicated that albeit being partisan, civil so-
ciety tended to maintain a considerable distance from political parties. 
Instead of endorsing Jokowi’s nomination to political party, civil society 
activists established many new volunteer organizations or groups to sup-
port Jokowi’s candidacy and took over the parties’ function as campaign 
machine during the election (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015, 20).
Within a year, the number of these volunteer groups increased to 
hundreds and involved various elements. More than 100 volunteer orga-
nizations were founded from 2013 to 2014 and declared their support to 
Jokowi as presidential candidate, for example Bara JP, PROJO, Almisbat, 
Seknas Jokowi, Duta Jokowi, ARM, Jokowi Mania, Solmet Jokowi, Arus 
Bawah Jokowi, Kawan Jokowi, Jasmev, Gerak Indonesia, Kornas Jokowi, 
JPKP, GK Center, RPJP, EP for Jokowi, Komunitas Alumni Perguruan 
Tinggi, Sekber Jokowi, GRI, RKIH, Kabar Nawacita, and Forkami. Ac-
cording to Gultom, the coordinating secretary of the Tim Koordinasi 
Relawan Nasional Jokowi–JK (National Volunteer Coordination Team 
for Jokowi–JK), approximately 1,289 volunteer groups were established 
throughout Indonesia, comprising an estimated of 1–1.5 million mem-
bers or sympathizers. This figure is based on the declarations of vol-
unteer status released by the team’s office. Many groups, however, did 
not register their members. Thus, the estimate is believed to be only 
one third of all the volunteers (Lay 2015, 33). As the establishment of 
the volunteer groups was not directed by Jokowi but more by grassroots 
participation, they were loosely organized. Thus, creating a list compris-
ing all the members of the volunteer groups is not possible. The most 
notable characteristic of the volunteer groups is that they included indi-
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viduals from the lower classes such as housewives, traders at traditional 
markets, musicians and youth, as well as businesspeople and political 
figures (Suaedy 2015). For example, one prominent volunteer organiza-
tion, namely Bara JP (Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden), claimed that 
its members were from various backgrounds, namely journalists, politi-
cians, actors, artists, lawyers, and students. 
For Jokowi, the importance of volunteers was unquestionable to the 
point that he acknowledged that without the support of volunteers, it 
would have been impossible for him to be nominated by his party 
and win the election. Table 1 below presents several volunteer groups 
considered to be important and to have leading roles in mobilizing 
support, shaping public opinion, and campaigning for Jokowi in the 
2014 presidential election.
Table 1 
Major Volunteer Groups Supporting Jokowi
Name Network Background Reasons for Support Form of Support
BARA JP
(Established 
on June 15, 
2013)
34 provinces, 67 
countries
Activists 
from various 
backgrounds: 
professionals, 
journalists, worker 
activists, musicians, 
etc
• Crisis of trust 
toward political 
elites
• Aspiring for 
political changes
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate
• Collect 15 million 
signatures on a petition 
for the PDI-P to 
nominate Jokowi
• Mobilize 500 witnesses 
on ballot day
SEKNAS 
JOKOWI
(Established 
on Dec 15, 
2013
30 provinces, 
267 districts, 
2000 members, 
several wing 
organizations
Civil society and 
democracy activists 
from various CSOs
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate
• Safeguarding 
Indonesian 
democracy and 
democratic reform 
agenda
• Organize a national 
poster competition
• Formulate agenda and 
platforms for Nawacita 
campaign 
• Design campaign for 
youth and women’s 
groups
PROJO 
(Established 
on Dec 23, 
2014)
34 provinces, 
497 regencies/ 
municipalities
Student activists 
from the 1980s, 
PDI-P members and 
party activists 
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate  
• Influence PDI-P to 
nominate Jokowi
• Mobilize 500 witnesses 
on ballot day
• Provide campaign 
attributes
ALMISBAT
(Established 
on April 4, 
2014)
40 districts in 7 
provinces
Student activists 
from the 1998 
Reform movement, 
PDIP members and 
party activists.
• Refusal of Prabowo 
and New Order’s 
revival 
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate  
• Design campaign for 
youth groups and 
students
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DUTA JOKOWI
(Established 
on June 10, 
2014)
33 provinces 1999 student 
activists, musicians, 
Christian activists 
from KWI. 
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate  
• Conduct political 
canvassing in 100 cities.
• Extend territorial 
activities through 
networking with various 
organizations
POSPERA
(Established 
on April 30, 
2014)
23 provinces, 
277 regencies/ 
municipalities, 
2000 volunteers
Student activists 
from the 1998 
Reform movement
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate  
• Conduct  political 
canvassing
• Extend territorial 
activities throughout 
Indonesia
• Distribute campaign 
attributes to voters
KAWAN 
JOKOWI
(Established 
on May 13, 
2014)
22 provinces Activists 
from various 
backgrounds: 
professionals, 
musicians, social 
activists, etc
• Supporting Jokowi 
as a presidential 
candidate  
• Launch a website to 
recruit volunteers 
(in cooperation with 
Barisan Muda JK)
• Design a campaign for 
youth groups through 
social media and 
YouTube
ARM 
(Established 
on March 8, 
2014)
Several labor 
unions 
Labor activists and 
networks
• Supporting Jokowi 
as presidential 
candidate  
• Mobilize support from 
the working class
• Develop network 
with various national 
and local worker 
organizations
KMB for 
JKW-JK
(Established 
on May 28, 
2014)
34 provinces, 
300 regencies 
Business 
communities
• Supporting Jokowi 
as presidential 
candidate  
• Mobilize support from 
business communities 
for Jokowi-Kalla
JASMEV 2014
(established 
on Aug 12, 
2012, re-
activated in 
2014)
31 regional 
coordinators (in 
big cities and 
some foreign 
countries); 1000 
members
Professionals, social 
media activists
• Supporting Jokowi 
as presidential 
candidate  
• Campaign for Jokowi on 
social media 
Source: Author’s compilation from various sources.
Although the mobilization of volunteer groups can also be found 
in Prabowo’s campaign, volunteer groups that supported Jokowi had 
distinctive features compared to Prabowo’s volunteers, especially in 
terms of size, characteristics, and background. Prabowo’s volunteers 
were mostly established by political parties and operated under the 
parties’ commands, while Jokowi’s volunteers were mainly established 
and loosely coordinated by civil-society activists and comprised various 
segments of society: youth, students, activists, musicians, workers, celeb-
rities, and political figures. Furthermore, the scope of Jokowi’s volunteer 
networks covered the national and subnational levels, for example, the 
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provincial, regency, municipal, and neighborhood levels throughout the 
country and were mostly initiated by non-political activists.
In terms of organizational scope, volunteer groups that supported 
Jokowi can be categorized into three types. First, organizations operat-
ing at the national level became prominent groups. These organizations 
were established either by party activists or civil-society activists, had 
official branches in many provinces and regions, and maintained a 
minimum level of coordination. These organizations created various 
methods of campaigning and provided campaign attributes and distrib-
uted them to small volunteer groups at the local level. Second, orga-
nizations established as branch groups at the provincial, regency, and 
municipal levels. Some organizations were established as international 
branches and mobilized support from Indonesian citizens living abroad. 
Third, local volunteer groups established throughout the country by 
local communities, individuals, groups initiatives, and interest groups.
Another notable feature of the volunteer groups that supported 
Jokowi is they were established long before the 2014 election. Nota-
bly, the presence of volunteer groups that supported Jokowi was flour-
ishing in 2012, when several volunteer groups emerged as extra-party 
campaign teams for Joko Widodo–Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly 
known as Jokowi–Ahok), who were candidates for gubernatorial po-
sitions in Jakarta’s 2012 election. The notable characteristic of these 
groups was their heterogeneity in terms of affiliations, backgrounds, 
campaign methods, and area of operation. In the 2014 presidential 
election, many of these volunteer groups continued to support Jokowi 
due to his record of promoting bureaucratic reform in Jakarta. One 
volunteer said,
“they had a range of different religious affiliations, ethnicities, so-
cial classes, professions, hobbies, origins and education. Some were 
from political parties or were friends of party activists who had cast 
aside their party identities, while others had no affiliation at all to 
political parties, or had initially sympathized with another pair of 
candidates before shifting. The volunteers’ areas of operation also 
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differed, being defined either by geographical territory, segments of 
society, or the virtual/ real world. Each group of volunteers was gen-
erally formed out of the initiatives of several people, with a number 
of others joining later. Their methods also varied; some worked in 
a systematic and organized manner within a group of volunteers, 
while others worked alone” (Suaedy 2014).
VOLUNTEERS A ND THE DEMOCR ATIC -
BUILDING FUNCTION 
Regarding the establishment of volunteer groups, at least three expla-
nations provide insights into the phenomenon of the volunteer groups. 
First, the phenomenon can be perceived as a sign of skepticism and 
political distrust toward political parties. In this condition, political 
parties are considered corrupt entities characterized by patrimonial 
politics (Aspinall 2010), neo-authoritarian platforms (Mietzner 2009), 
massive corruption, and disconnection with their constituents (Hamid 
2012). Consequently, when volunteer groups emerged and assumed a 
role to assist the political parties, they became more publicly acceptable. 
Although the volunteer groups are outside the party and even tend to 
be antiparty, they operate similar to a party in terms of campaigning 
and mobilizing support for a candidate. Organizations such as PROJO 
served the role of political parties during the campaign and performed 
various duties, for example, preparing witnesses in polling stations, 
mobilizing support, designing campaigns and advertising, agitating, 
and monitoring the voting process (Interview with Budi Ari Setiadi, 
September 18, 2016).
Second, the volunteering phenomenon is also considered a struggle 
against the oligarchy. Indonesia’s post-transition politics is characterized 
by an oligarchic democracy1 (Winters 2013; Ford and Pepinsky 2014). 
When Prabowo ran for president in this particular election, many in-
1 Despite being accredited as the third largest democracy in the world and one of the best 
examples of democracy in Southeast Asia, a democratization assessment of Indonesia reveals 
serious pitfalls. As Indonesian democracy consolidates, oligarchs are increasingly positioned as 
key arbiters of the country’s political life (Winters in Ford and Pepinsky 2014, 3).
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dividuals believed that he represented the oligarchs. Civil society con-
sidered him a symbol of old authoritarian Indonesia and volunteers 
believed that this particular election was the “final battle” between 
the New Order and the Reform Era (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015, 
22). Hence, many volunteers could have been supporting Jokowi in this 
election. An argument was made that the volunteer groups emerged 
not only because of the distrust of the parties but also because they 
rejected the elite’s behavior, which tended to be formalistic and elitist, 
and ignored the will of the people (Aequina 2016). Thus, individuals 
opted to form a volunteer group and participate in the election, whether 
to monitor the process or to mobilize support for a candidate. Lastly, 
the emergence of volunteer groups is related to the electoral politics 
of the civil society in the presidential election. Although civil society 
activists have opportunities to nominate themselves as candidates in 
legislative elections, with or without political parties, the situation was, 
of course, different in this election. The capacity of civil society to 
nominate their own candidate was limited, if it existed at all, because 
no independent candidate ran in this election. Hence, many civil so-
ciety activists joined volunteer groups as a vehicle and an alternative 
channel for their electoral politics and to take advantage of the political 
opportunity of that time. 
Although these arguments may explain the emergence of volunteer 
groups and their role in fulfilling the functions of political parties in 
the election, an association between the volunteers’ role and democratic 
deepening has not been observed. Thus, careful examination of the 
extent to which the emergence and role of volunteers in the election 
contributed to the development of a robust civil society and to the dem-
ocratic deepening in Indonesia is needed and assessment of whether 
their support of Jokowi for president was based on the democratic re-
form agenda is also necessary to clarify the assumptions of civil society 
as an engine for democratization. At one point, this article agrees that 
the role of volunteers is indeed significant and undoubtedly a factor 
behind Jokowi’s victory in the 2014 presidential election. In addition, 
the article accredits the importance of “traditional” civic organizations 
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as a watchdog for the election to ensure that the process and results are 
credible. During the election, civic organizations and individuals were 
actively involved in monitoring, observing, and checking the outcomes 
of the election and inviting public participation in the recapitulation of 
the votes. Arguably, such initiatives are critical because they prevented 
irregularities in that election and will prevent irregularities in future 
elections. According to Lanćee (2014), such initiatives have marked civil 
society’s agenda in support of electoral integrity and are significance 
to make it legitimate, open to scrutiny, and apt to change that could 
promote fairer proceedings and increased levels of trust among the 
electorate.
With regard to the role of volunteers, Sefsani and Ziegenhain (2015) 
argued that Jokowi’s volunteers used three predominant means to con-
tribute to the deepening of democracy in Indonesia: “By being active 
and undertaking the election campaign activities mentioned previously, 
the voluntary groups fulfilled various functions of a civil society, which 
Diamond has identified as being supportive of democracy. By spreading 
information about Joko Widodo’s democratic reform agenda, volunteer 
groups disseminated democratic ideas and values. By being autonomous 
and voluntary, the volunteer organizations set an example, advocating 
a change from electoral support as a form of clientelism to self-directed 
and participatory citizenship. The activities of the relawan organizations 
were an example of active involvement in politics by normal citizens and 
empowered many individuals who had not taken an active interest in 
politics in the past, and thus stimulated political participation” (Sefsani 
and Ziegenhain 2015, 30).
For many volunteers, supporting Jokowi over Prabowo meant fight-
ing for improvements in Indonesian democracy. By choosing the popu-
list version of Jokowi over the populist version of Prabowo, civic groups’ 
expectations were high, that is, a Jokowi presidency would be marked by 
transparency, accountability, rule of law, and respect for human rights 
(Vaughn 2014). Such high expectations had been expressed widely by 
various elements of civil society, including individuals participating in 
voluntary actions to campaign on his behalf. Through social media, 
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people expressed their approval for Jokowi freely, using the ribbon “I 
Stand on the Right Side” next to their avatars on Facebook and Twitter, 
implying that the best choice was to support Jokowi. Compared with 
the enormous support that Jokowi received in the election, Prabowo 
received a considerably strong rejection from many prodemocracy el-
ements. Civic groups and national media coverage seemed to favor 
Jokowi over Prabowo. Notably, The Jakarta Post, in an unprecedented 
and bold move, expressed its rejection of Prabowo explicitly and en-
dorsed Jokowi in an editorial column, “Endorsing Jokowi” (the Jakarta 
Post, July 4, 2014).
In the opinion of Jokowi’s supporters, stand up for Jokowi was in-
terpreted as support for strengthened democratization in the country 
and “a battle” to safeguard the future of Indonesian democracy. At 
this point, civil society is considered being partisan in this election as 
a mean to ensure the advancement of the democratic agenda under 
Jokowi’s administration—if he won. However, this article asserts that the 
discussion of civil society should investigate that its establishment and 
role as agents of democratization may be hindered by the complexities 
within civil society itself; thus, an investigation of the case of volunteers 
from this perspective is worthwhile.  A realistic assessment on the role 
of the volunteer groups that supported Jokowi reveals volunteers remain 
constrained by their capacity to strengthen democracy. Although the 
role of the volunteers have fulfilled some of the democratic-building 
functions, an examination of whether such functions were run only by 
volunteers during the election is necessary. The success of volunteers in 
endorsing Jokowi’s candidacy to the political parties and fulfilling their 
function as Jokowi’s campaigners is not necessarily associated with the 
democratic-building function as Diamond advocates. Instead, volun-
teers are functioned as an “extra political party” in Jokowi’s campaign.
Civil society in its ideal form is more likely to contribute to the 
democratic process if it maintains its fundamental role to empower 
people and serves as the counterbalance power and as the watchdog 
of the election. In the context of the 2014 presidential election, these 
roles were played mostly by the so-called traditional civic organizations. 
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These organizations gathered and produced collective actions to ensure 
the integrity of the election and were directly engaged in canvassing 
and interacting with voters to generate opportunities for public partici-
pation in the election process and result. Support for candidates in this 
context must be considered as personal preference, with the democratic 
reform agenda being a secondary priority. However, this condition was 
not the case for volunteer groups that supported Jokowi; their estab-
lishment and motivations were more complex, and some groups were 
created solely to win Jokowi’s campaign, not to pursue further demo-
cratic agenda. Furthermore, some groups were even created to seek 
political and economic interests of their members, while some operated 
like political parties. Hence, relating the role of the volunteers to the 
democratic deepening process in Indonesia might be presumptive and 
oversimplified. 
THE COMPLEX NATUR E OF VOLUNTEER 
GROUPS SUPPORTING JOKOW I
Although the aforementioned arguments support the vital role of 
civil society—and volunteers in particular—during the election, these 
claims have not investigated the possibility that these volunteer groups 
may have had undemocratic goals. Notably, regarding this point, Sury-
ajaya (2014) asserted that volunteer groups that supported Jokowi also 
consisted of individuals with an interest in advancing their political 
goals and that a distinction must be made among the volunteers based 
on their motivation prior to and after the election (Table 2).
Table 2 
Type of Volunteer Groups Supporting Jokowi
Motivation Type of 
Volunteers
Political Position in the 
Post-Election
Assessments
Supporting Jokowi as a 
refusal of Prabowo
Anti-Prabowo 
Volunteers
Critical to Jokowi’s 
administration
• Realistic expectation toward 
Jokowi’s administration
• Maintain critical position toward 
Jokowi’s governance
Supporting Jokowi due 
to his personality
Volunteers 
Type A
Supporting Jokowi for 
personal reason
• Militant supporters, whose 
militancy relied on Jokowi’s 
figure
• Key factor for Jokowi’s victory
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Supporting Jokowi due 
to his programs
Volunteers 
Type B
Critical supports based 
on programmatic 
issues
• Solid support towards Jokowi 
despite negative opinion or 
Jokowi’s personality.
• Attracted to Jokowi because of 
his programmatic issues 
• Key factor for Jokowi’s victory 
Supporting Jokowi for 
political opportunity 
and career 
Oligarchs Concession and 
project-based support
• Aims for political positions for 
personal interest and forced 
Jokowi to engage in “horse 
trading” politics and abandon 
some of his programmatic 
agenda.
Source: sorted data from Suryajaya 2014.
After the election, one of the most upsetting occurrences was the 
influx of volunteer figures to state-owned enterprises (known as Badan 
Usaha Milik Negara, BUMN). While this tradition has been upheld 
by previous presidents as a means of providing political compensation, 
Jokowi’s administration was no exception to this tradition despite his 
pledge to run an open government free of collusion and free of horse-
trading politics. Not long after his inauguration as the president of In-
donesia, Jokowi appointed a considerable number of figures from the 
volunteer groups to political offices in state institutions or as commis-
sioners in various BUMN. As admitted by Adian Napitulu, a Pospera 
leader, many of Pospera members were appointed as commissioners in 
BUMN, mostly at PTPN (PT Perkebunan Nusantara) located in many 
provinces (Sumandoyo 2016). Similarly, PROJO officials reported that 
many PROJO figures were appointed as commissioners in various SOEs 
and were involved in facilitating the implementation of government 
programs in various regions.  
Thus, coming to the following conclusion was not difficult. The 
employment of volunteers, politicians, and success teams was used as 
compensation for their support in helping Jokowi win the election. 
In Indonesian political tradition, commissioner positions in SOEs are 
typically considered a reward from the government-elect to individu-
als who have connections to the government and were involved in the 
political process prior to the election. Hence, supporting Jokowi with 
the expectation of political reward is not unusual for volunteer groups, 
despite their initial support for Jokowi to achieve democratic goals. The 
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salary of a commissioner ranges from IDR 10 to 120 million, depend-
ing on company’s revenue; thus, unsurprisingly, many volunteers were 
interested in becoming commissioners. Notably, many volunteers ap-
plied to become a commissioner through Rumah Transisi, an ad hoc 
team led by Rini Soemarno (later the Minister of SOEs) that prepared 
a blueprint for Jokowi’s administration.
From the volunteers’ perspective, being a commissioner and par-
ticipating in the government is part of their responsibility to safeguard 
Jokowi’s administration, to advocate policy changes within the govern-
ment, and to ensure that the victory is maintained after the election. 
As argued by PROJO officials, President Jokowi’s policy of granting 
offices concurred with precedent considering the significant role of 
PROJO in endorsing Jokowi’s candidacy and supporting his campaign: 
“Some of PROJO’s members were assigned several SOEs to safeguard 
the implementation of the Nawacita program of Jokowi–JK” (Interview, 
September 12, 2016). Correspondingly, Budi Ari Setiadi, Chairman of 
PROJO, also stated: “By contrast, if we weren’t involved [in the govern-
ment] that would be odd. Although in my case, I don’t have motivation to 
be commissioner, I support my fellow volunteers who fulfill that position. 
Who else then? We don’t have to deny that volunteers are allowed to help 
[Jokowi] after election. In my opinion, the more volunteers [that become 
commissioners] there are, the better.”
Similar arguments from the volunteers can also be found in their 
statements reported in the mass media, namely, the sharp criticism 
from the public and the opposing opinions of volunteers regarding such 
behavior (Alvionitasari & Sugiharto 2016). Amid the rising criticism of 
volunteers’ influx in SOEs, President Jokowi stated, “Everything is in ac-
cordance with the selection mechanism, and the government aims to make 
SOEs a driving force for economy and infrastructure” (Supratiwi 2015). 
However, Vice President Jusuf Kalla was more frank in responding to 
the critics. He said that the appointment of volunteers as commissioners 
by the President was part of the political tradition in Indonesian politics, 
that is, a new precedent had not been set (Pratomo 2015). According 
to Suaedy, the involvement of volunteers within the political system 
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following Jokowi’s victory was a consequence of a partisan social move-
ment; to take charge of the postelection political agenda, they had to 
be included in the government. Being involved and placed in strategic 
positions would make it easier for the volunteers to endorse substantial 
changes within policies without undermining democratic procedures 
(Suaedy 2016). As argued by Farid, founder of Seknas Jokowi, Jokowi’s 
victory in the presidential election opened a space for volunteers to be 
directly involved from within and being a policy maker is more effec-
tive than being a watchdog for the government (Interview with KSI, 
March 31, 2017).
Arguably, this opportunistic behavior of volunteers confirms the 
problematic nature of the volunteer groups that supported Jokowi for 
president. First, it only nurtures, if not worsens, the tradition of “horse-
trading politics” in Indonesia. Although Jokowi promised his presidency 
would end transactional politics, the opposite has been observed. The 
formation of a “cabinet of compromise” and the distribution of impor-
tant positions among the volunteers and other supporters of his cam-
paign was clearly the result of a horse-trading brand of politics. Second, 
this opportunistic behavior of volunteers refutes the argument that the 
volunteer groups that supported Jokowi had prodemocratic goals. In-
stead of safeguarding Jokowi’s administration from the party oligarchs 
who attempt to paralyze and tame his power, these volunteers emerged 
as another group of oligarchs seeking power and wealth. Notably, the 
politics of volunteers during the election was epitomized in an online 
media special report called “Gurita Timses di BUMN”—Leviathans in 
State-Owned Companies (Sumandoyo 2016).
LIMITS OF THE VOLUNTEERS’ 
DEMOCR AC Y-BUILDING FUNCTIONS 
Although this article agrees that volunteers are instrumental in 
encouraging political participation, the extent of their role in fulfill-
ing democratic functions was aimed particularly at gaining votes and 
winning the presidency for Jokowi. The partisanship of the volunteers 
has constrained their ability to fulfill the democratic functions of a 
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progressive civil society. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, not all volun-
teer organizations promoted democratic reform or further democratic 
agenda. Many were established solely to win Jokowi’s campaign. In 
this context, a comparison of the volunteers’ agenda and “traditional” 
CSOs’ agenda would be worthwhile.2 Compared to the extraordinary 
(and unprecedented) involvement of traditional CSOs in organizing 
collective action, monitoring the election and  generating opportuni-
ties for public participation, the seemingly active and robust volunteer 
groups that played a pivotal role in the 2014 presidential election do 
not reflect a strong, robust civil society, which Putnam and Diamond 
have argued is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation.
Unlike the party oligarchs, volunteer groups that supported Jokowi 
were not a solid entity, that is, these groups were loosely organized, al-
lied, involved many elements, and were considerably fragmented. The 
only factor that unified civil society (and volunteer groups) during the 
2014 presidential election was Prabowo’s candidacy. The presidential 
campaigns of Jokowi and Prabowo provided space for civil society to 
participate and use collective action to take a leading role in the elec-
tion: to monitor the election or support Jokowi’s candidacy. However, 
the situation changed after the election. Depending on their motivation, 
Jokowi’s supporters may have had different attitudes toward Jokowi’s 
administration: some might return to political apathy (Savirani 2015), 
some would return to critiquing civil society, and some others who 
gained “rewards” would be most likely to continue supporting Jokowi.
In addition, not all volunteer organizations supported democratic 
reform agenda. One reason for this phenomenon is because some vol-
unteer groups were created simply to support Jokowi’s campaign and 
helped him win the election. Consequently, most of these organiza-
tions dissolved after the election, except for PROJO and Pospera, which 
transformed into mass organization (known as ormas). The fact that the 
volunteer groups supporting Jokowi also consisted of “career-seekers” 
and “opportunists” has provided evidence to the argument in this paper. 
2 In this paper, “traditional” refers to established CSOs working on various topics, including 
anticorruption, an election watch, the environment, human rights, and democracy.
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In this context, the nature of voluntary groups, that is dynamic and 
loosely organized, will have negative impact if misused by individuals 
with political motives (DEMOS 2015), as is the case for the volunteers 
who expect “rewards” in return for their support.
Limited by a seemingly narrow agenda, the role of volunteers is thus 
only instrumental in helping Jokowi with the election and far from con-
tributing to the deepening of Indonesian democracy after the election—
as has been argued in the literature. Notably, political volunteerism has 
successfully become a new phenomenon in Indonesian politics; thus, a 
more substantial discussion of the role of volunteers during elections is 
necessary. As one study argued, the function of volunteers should not 
be limited to supporting a candidate alone; instead, volunteers should 
feel morally obliged to participate in creating the new administration’s 
agenda to ensure that the promises made by the candidate to the elec-
torate during the campaign period are implemented (Suryajaya 2014). In 
other words, to provide substantive meaning to the phenomenon of po-
litical volunteerism, the electoral politics of civil society must be based 
on programmatic issues; only by doing this can volunteers and civil 
society contribute to the democratic deepening in Indonesia. Construct-
ing electoral support on the basis of programmatic issues will also help 
to ensure that civil society is fulfilling its democracy-building function. 
Hence, the question remains: can volunteers function as civil society 
if they do not distance themselves from the government? Consider-
ing the findings of this investigation into how most of the volunteers 
positioned themselves after the election, such expectations may be too 
hollow. Even an organization such as PROJO positioned its organiza-
tion as a “die-hard” supporter of Jokowi’s administration, despite their 
transformation into an ormas after the election.
Instead of fulfilling civil society’s democracy-building functions, 
most volunteers were likely functioning as an arm of Jokowi’s elec-
tion campaign: providing an electoral base, mobilizing support from 
voters, and campaigning for Jokowi. After the election, the volunteers 
supported Jokowi’s government and acted to safeguard Jokowi’s govern-
ment through their involvement within it. This position, in the end, will 
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hamper their role in functioning as an independent civil society if they 
remain inside the government. That said, disconnection was observed 
between the seemingly democratic role of the volunteers during and 
after the presidential election. Although the role of volunteers increased 
the integrity of the election and the democratic process throughout the 
election, the problematic nature of the volunteer groups that supported 
Jokowi hindered the function of civil society after the election. The 
appointment of volunteer activists as commissioners, for instance, has 
resulted in skepticism and prejudice regarding the real motives behind 
the establishment of the volunteer groups and their reasons to support 
Jokowi in this election. Thus, most of the traditional organizations not 
clearly stating their support for Jokowi’s bid for the presidency and fo-
cusing on preventing election irregularities by actively monitoring the 
process and the result makes sense. Although some members of tradi-
tional organizations joined volunteer groups, little effect, if any, was 
observed regarding the independence of the organizations.
Thus, a more in-depth investigation into civil society’s support for 
Jokowi during his campaign for president, which was presumed to be 
morally appropriate, should be reconsidered. Although the support of 
civil society was the foremost factor in Jokowi winning the presidential 
election, his candidacy was also possible because of his party supporters. 
By contrast, civil society’s capacity to transform politics through being 
the impetus that won Jokowi the election may not have succeeded in 
influencing his actions after the election. Despite the ability of civil 
society (in the form of volunteer organizations) to mobilize public sup-
port during the election and become a so-called hero of democracy, this 
capacity is of limited relevance to the democratization of Indonesia. In 
line with the democratic consolidation agenda, civil society’s capacity 
to challenge oligarchic influence after the election was also restricted. 
CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that volunteers played an instrumental 
role in the democratic process in the 2014 presidential election. Their 
contribution to making the election a success and putting a popular 
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candidate into power has resulted in new hope for a flourishing, pro-
gressive civil society. To some extent, volunteers contributed to the im-
provement of the democratic process in the election: they stimulated 
citizens’ political participation to legitimize the election and ensure 
that no irregularities occurred. 
However, the discussion of volunteers in connection with demo-
cratic-building functions required consideration because volunteers are 
constrained by the problematic nature of volunteerism. Driven by the 
objective to elect Jokowi as president, volunteers were significant as 
campaigners and as a substitute for the function of political parties, 
but were irrelevant after the election. After the election, the presum-
ably democratic volunteers did not manifest the expectation of being 
democratic champions, and instead, became rogues who exhibited op-
portunistic political behavior. In the end, the complex nature of volun-
teers impedes their capacity to advance the democratic agenda under 
Jokowi’s administration.
In light of the seemingly progressive nature of civil society, the case 
of volunteerism in the 2014 presidential election provides little evidence 
to support the many assumptions linking vibrant, flourishing volunteer 
groups to the democratic functions of civil society. The case of politi-
cal volunteerism in Indonesia, instead, demonstrates that the volunteer 
phenomenon is more related to the dysfunctional political parties, and 
that volunteers are instrumental in fulfilling various functions of po-
litical parties during the election. Although the success of volunteers 
as campaigners has inspired similar movements in local elections in 
Indonesia, this article suggests that it remains too early to attribute 
the embodiment of a progressive civil society in line with democratic-
building functions to volunteerism.
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